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ABSTRACT 
This paper evaluates the role of the Sydney Harbour Trust in the first 
decade of its existence. Although the Trust was formed in the aftermath of 
the outbreak of bubonic plague in Sydney in 1900, the need for an overhaul 
of the facilities in the port had been recognised for some time. Shipping 
technology had been transformed in the last half century, mainly due to the 
adaption of steel and iron for ships. However, the port had not kept up with 
the changes occurring in shipping. The Harbour Trust, therefore, set about 
reconstructing the harbour in response to the new technology. 
A significant feature of the Sydney Harbour Trust was that it had no ties 
whatsoever to the system of local government pertaining in Sydney at the 
time. Nor was it a government department, although it was seen as another 
arm of the state public works enterprise. The Sydney Harbour Trust was 
therefore the first of the ad hoc authorities without local government links 
formed in New South Wales. 
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THE SYDNEY HARBOUR TRUST: 
The Early Years 
Neil O'Flanagan 
Urban Research Unit 
Until the formation of the Sydney Harbour Trust in 1901, the 
responsibility for the upkeep of Sydney harbour lay in the hands of the 
municipal authorities. The new Trust, however, did not include any 
municipal representation. The Trust was the first public body created 
through a transfer of powers from local authorities to an ad hoc board in 
New South Wales. The first Commissioners were appointed solely by the 
government. Instead of being recruited from the realm of local politics, 
they were drawn from commercial and engineering backgrounds and their 
task was essentially the reconstruction of the wharfage, and the regulation 
of the harbour for shipping, including ferries. 
The early years of the Trust were dominated by the reconstruction of 
the port wharfage, in particular, by Robert Hickson, the President of the 
Trust, and Henry Deane Walsh. Both men were engineers who previously 
belonged to the Department of Public Works. The appointment of Hickson 
and Walsh to the Trust is perhaps best understood as a transfer of men 
involved in one area of public works to another. They attest to the 
continuing interest of the state in the construction of the infrastructure of 
Sydney. This provides the key to the reluctance of the government to grant 
the powers of reconstruction to the local authorities. Since the Sydney 
Harbour Trust was in effect another arm of a public works programme, it 
had at all times to be under the control of the government. The government 
was not yet ready to hand over the control of 'public works' to local 
government as was the case in the United Kingdom at the time. I 
It was understandable that engineers had such a significant role in the 
Trust as the need for a new port authority was strongly influenced by the 
advances in engineering technology. Due to the impact of steel and iron 
See F.A. Larcombe, The Stabilization of Local Government in New South Wales 
1858-1906, Vol 2, Sydney, 1976, p.244. 
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upon the shipping industry from the 1870's, Sydney harbour was becoming 
increasingly outdated as a major port. The use of steel in shipbuilding from 
the 1870's led to a massive increase in the size of ships on the world's seas, 
and to a corresponding growth in tonnage entering Sydney. The growth of 
seaborne trade was a worldwide phenomenon in large part due to the shift 
from timber-constructed ships to ships built of steel and iron. The use of 
timber had previously placed a limit on the size of ships, but far bigger ships 
could be built with steel and iron. The first large four masted ship, 
measuring 350 feet, to arrive in Sydney was an iron steamer, the 
MacGregor, in 1870. A rush of large ships in the years that followed led to 
the appointment of a Select Committee in June 1874 to inquire into the 
wharfage accommodation of Sydney port. Few people interested in 
shipping, however, fully expected the vast increase in the scale of ships that 
would occur over the next three or four decades. In 1870, 1,006 ships of an 
aggregate tonnage of 385,161 entered Sydney harbour. By 1900, the 
number of ships entering the harbour had risen to 1819 with an aggregate 
tonnage of 2,716,651.2 
The arrival of the Lusitania in 1877 marked the beginning of a 
revolutionary increase in the size of ships entering the harbour. Vessels of 
three thousands tonnes were followed by vessels twice their size in the space 
of a decade. The first of the ships over 10,000 tonnes arrived in 1897. This 
was the Barbarossa, which belonged to the Norddeutscher Lloyd Company. 
Similar-sized steamers of the White Star line followed shortly afterwards. 
The increase in the size of ocean-going steamers was reflected in other 
coastal traders and ocean tramps. By 1900, it was obvious to everybody that 
the old, privately-owned, pre-1880 wharves which measured 300 feet long, 
with just 80 or 90 feet between them were no longer suitable for modem 
day shipping. 
The formation of the Sydney Harbour Trust was not, however, the 
direct result of the concern of the state for the congested and unwieldy port. 
The establishment of the Sydney Harbour Trust in March 1901 was inspired 
by the outbreak of bubonic plague in the early months of 1900. 
Nevertheless, the impact of large ships is a factor in the outbreak of the 
2 Henry Deane Walsh, 'Notes on Wharf Construction, Sydney Harbour', Royal 
Society of New South Wales, Journal and Proceedings, Vol 11, 1906, pxxv. 
2 
plague. As the size of ships increased it was necessary to dredge the berths 
ever deeper to accommodate them. As a result the lower part of the sea wall 
subsided, and this subsidence left cavities which allowed the rats to make 
their home under the wharves. This was in spite of the practice of driving 
down timber piling into the sea bed to prevent the soil from sliding.3 
It is not surprising that the plague entered the city from the wharves of 
Darling Harbour and Dawes Point under which the infected rats 
accumulated. The disease spread among the waterside families, particularly 
along Sussex Street. Between January and August 1900, the period at which 
the plague was at its most intense, some 303 persons were infected, and of 
those 103 died.4 The outbreak prompted members of both sides of the 
Legislative Assembly to sign a petition calling for the resumption of the 
foreshores to Darling Harbour. The petition, signed by over 90 members, 
led to the immediate resumption of the foreshores by proclamation on the 
3 May 1900. 
The government had already assumed legal control of the area on the 
23 March under the Quarantine Act of 1897. Just as the Premier, William 
Lyne, was pushed by the weight of the Assembly to proclaim the area for 
resumption, public opinion, indeed public concern, pushed Lyne towards a 
general quarantine. All over Sydney 'a great crusade of cleanliness' had 
been embarked upon in the month of March.5 Many suburban municipal 
councils ordered their staffs to clean all their lanes and roads and to 
disinfect drains and gutters. Garbage disposal was stepped up; horsedrawn 
omnibuses and cabs were disinfected daily as were many wharves and 
streets. Most of the fish in Darling Harbour were killed as a result of the 
enormous amount of disinfectant that flowed into the harbour.6 
In spite of these efforts, the number of people stricken with the disease 
rose dramatically from the middle of March. The number of cases rose 
from two in the week ending 3 March, to five the following week and to 
3 
4 
5 
6 
H.D. Walsh, 'Notes on Wharf Construction, Sydney Harbour' . 1906, xll. 
J. Ashburton Thompson, Report on the Outbreak of Plague at Sydney, 1900, 
Department of Public Health, New South Wales, Sydney, 1900. 
See Dan Huon Coward, Out of Sight: Sydney's Environmental History, 1851-1981, 
Canberra, 1988, p.210. 
Ibid. 
3 
twelve the week after.7 Panic broke out on 21 March when the building 
where the Department of Public Health was carrying out inoculations drew 
a frightened crowd of thousands. The building was invaded and the 
staircases were completely packed. Hundreds more tried to force their way 
in, often through the windows.8 According to the Chief Medical Officer of 
the Department of Health, J. Ashburton Thompson, the 'popular 
excitement' threatened the control of the department in combating the 
disease.9 The need for a government-controlled quarantine was clear. 
For the shipowners, however, the outbreak of the plague and the public 
fear of it provided them with an opportunity to press for a general 
reconstruction of the harbour in line with the changes in shipping 
technology. When Premier Lyne, met the shipping companies before he 
made the order to quarantine the area, they urged the government not only 
to clean the wharves but to take one step further and resume the whole area 
for the purpose of reconstructing the wharves 'on a broad national basis'.10 
They maintained this was the only sure way of ridding the city of the plague. 
By passing the expense of the reconstruction of the wharves onto the 
state on the basis of public health, the shipping companies avoided the costs 
of harbour reconstruction themselves. This is somewhat ironic as the poor 
state of the harbour facilities was in many respects due to the shipowners 
themselves. For many years, they avoided paying wharfage rates to the City 
Council. This evasion was so widespread it was regarded as 'evidence of 
commercial astuteness' rather than as a breach of 'commercial morality' 
among the shipowners and merchants of Darling Harbour and Sussex 
Street.11 In addition, there was the practice, noted earlier, of dredging 
deeper berths without taking proper care of the harbour wall, thus 
providing ample space for the habitation of rats. 
The area eventually proclaimed by the Governor on 3 May conforms 
to the distribution of the major port-using companies from Dawes Point 
7 J. Ashburton Thompson, Report on the Outbreak of Plague at Sydney, p.8. 
8 Ibid, p.19; also W.M.Hughes, NSWPD, vol 103, p.208. 
9 J. Ashburton Thompson, Report on the Outbreak of Plague at Sydney, p.17. 
10 See Dan Coward, Out of Sight, p.209. 
11 Willes (Balmain), NSWPD, 4 July 1900, p.666. 
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across to Miller's Point, and down much of the length of Kent Street as far 
as Pyrmont Bridge. It included Sussex Street, perhaps the most congested 
street in the area, and the site of much of the plague in Sydney. A significant 
omission was that of the land belonging to the Australian Gaslight Company 
off Kent Street. The AGC apparently persuaded the government that they 
intended to move in the near future, and the government were better 
advised to avoid paying for the resumption at the present moment. At least, 
this was the reason Lyne gave to the Assembly.12 
The introduction of the Darling Harbour Wharves Resumption Bill 
(64 Vic. No. 10), to 'validate' the quarantine and resumptions already 
carried out, gave the members of the Legislative Assembly an opportunity 
to debate the question of the Gas Works. George Reid, the leader of the 
opposition assured Lyne that there could be 'no contest about the main 
principle of this measure at all'.13 But why resume all the other property 
this side of Darling Harbour and not the Gas Works? According to George 
Reid, some of the cabinet ministers must have known that the Gas Company 
would have become a valuable tenant if their premises had been resumed. 
The rental on the property, he estimated, would cover the cost of 
resumption within two years.14 From the point of view of the state, there 
was simply no justification for the omission: 
To tell us that the Gas Company would not go down on its knees to the 
Government to get a lease of this place is to say a thing no business man 
in Sydney would regard for an instant.15 
The Company was in fact tied to the site for years to come, according 
to Reid, and it could leave only at an enormous loss. Reid's judgement on 
the question appears to be correct as the company did not move from 
Darling Harbour for some time. Its presence on the site continued to be 
controversial in 1909 when the interim report of the Improvement 
12 NSWPD, 28 June 1900, p.545. 
13 NSWPD, 15 Aug 1900, p.1915. 
14 NSWPD, 5 July 1900, p.695. 
15 Ibid. 
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Commission dealt specifically with it16. The Commissioners called upon 
the government to resume the site immediately. The Wade Liberal-Reform 
government, however, made it clear that it would not resume the site and 
the report of the Commission was shelved indefinitely. It was not until 1912 
that the government finally resumed the site, at a cost of half a million 
pounds, and only then did the Company set in motion the process of 
removal.17 
Another aspect of the Darling Harbour Resumption Bill to cause 
concern was the inclusion of the area known as the 'Rocks'. At a cost of 
£800,000, the resumption of this area consumed one fifth of the budget 
allocated to the resumptions as a whole. Lyne had decided to include the 
area after making his first visit there in connection with the bill. What he 
saw appalled him: 
It is a place-practically in the heart of the city-which is really a 
disgrace to any city in the world. There are narrow lanes and crooked 
lanes, and until you get up near Fort-street, there is no thoroughfare 
which you can call a street.18 
Practically, certain parts of the 'Rocks' would have to be cleared to 
achieve a genuine renovation of the wharfage. The conglomeration of 
streets and alleyways barred an easy access to Miller's Point while Dawes 
Point was barred by the absence of a good through road from the Circular 
Quay area. In order to improve Dawes Point, and the area immediately 
behind it, the choice lay between widening and leveling Cumberland Street 
so that it could be connected with Sussex Street, or for the area between 
Dawes Point and Miller's Point to be cleared so that a major road could be 
laid to connect them. This could be continued, of course, to run down 
Darling Harbour.19 The second choice was eventually taken, and what 
became known as Hickson Road was constructed from Dawes Point, across 
to Miller's Point and down as far as the Australian Gas Light Company's 
16 NSWLA, Report of the Royal Commission for the Improvement of the City of 
Sydney and its Suburbs, 1909. 
17 Behind the Gas Flame: the Story of a Great Industry, Sydney, 1955, p.3. 
18 NSWPD, 28 June 1900, p 546. 
19 W.J. Spruson (Sydney-Gipps), Samuel Smith (Sydney-Pyrmont), 5 July, p.762-
764. 
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works. When these were eventually removed, Hickson Road met the newly-
widened Sussex Street. 
The government argued however that one reason for the resumption of 
the 'Rocks' was to prevent the unjustifiable increase in the value of property 
as a result of the work of the new Harbour Trust. It was even possible to 
resume some properties without any compensation being paid 
whatsoever.20 It was commonly held that the 'Rocks' was a slum area, and 
that much of the property there was worthless. Many of the landlords were 
deemed to be negligent and Lyne argued that resumption would ensure that 
they did not profit unfairly from the work of the Trust.21 
Not all members were convinced by these arguments. R.D. Meagher 
iconoclastically argued 'I will not support any attempt to improve that 
healthy locality in Sydney called "The Rocks".'22 His subversive view of 
the area was supported by another member, J.C. Watson. Although he 
admitted that the area was 'unsightly and inconvenient', he claimed: 
[It] was not insanitary-at least a great portion of it was not. A few of 
the lanes were dirty, more particularly on account of the laxity of the 
authorities in allowing people of all colours, castes and creeds to live 
there in the way they did; but "The Rocks" was not insanitary because 
of the location of the houses or the lack of drainage. Whatever 
insanitary conditions prevailed there were preventable . Therefore 
"The Rocks" was not on the same plane as ill-kept wharf age, which on 
account of its construction it was impossible to improve, and for the 
resumption was the only remedy.23 
There were some people, however, who insisted that the 'Rocks' was 
indeed a slum of the worst kind. One such was William Morris Hughes, 
Labour member for Lang. Hughes had recently emerged as the most 
powerful leader in the area, as head of the newly organised Wharf 
Labourers Union, and of the union representing carters and draymen.24 
20 NSWPD, 28 June 1900, p.547-8. Parts of Sussex Street could also be resumed 
without compensation. 
21 NSWPD, 5 July 1900, p.765. 
22 NSWPD , 28 June 1900, p.558-9. 
23 NSWPD, 5 July 1900, p.762. 
24 Fitzhardinge, William Morris Hughes, Vol I, 1862-1914, Sydney, p.108. 
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Hughes exploited the popular perception of the 'Rocks' to launch a 
devastating attack on the City Council. In a debate on the municipal 
franchise, he appeared to suggest that the City Council were largely to 
blame for the plague because of the poor state of the area.25 He called for 
the abolition of the Council immediately. It was not a workable system, he 
believed, and while not all the councillors could be blamed for the state of 
this local government, they were powerless to effect real change: 
I have been, in the heart of Sydney, up to my knees in abominable filth 
in premises which are owned, or at least partly owned, by the 
municipal council, not the council as a whole, but by members of it. I 
have been in places where the floor was up, and where the stench was 
such that, standing upon the joists upon which the floor has rested, it 
was impossible to remain . . . . About five steps from the back door of a 
place in Steam-Mill street I came to an outhouse which was in such a 
condition that the inspector kindly indicated to me in which corner 
typhoid lay and in which corner diphtheria, for any person inclined 
that way, might be able to pick it up. That was within five steps of the 
back door of a house partly owned by these aldermen.26 
Members of the Legislative Assembly were adamant that the 
waterfront should always remain a state concern and never be returned to 
the local council. When Reid raised the possibility that the rebuilt 'Rocks' 
could be handed back to a 'reformed' City council, it was feared that the 
wharves would be handed over as well. Haynes made it clear that he would 
support the bill: 
... on condition that they see that the whole of the management of the 
wharves becomes a state concern, and is not relegated to Greater 
Sydney as suggested by the leader of the opposition 27 
At this point in the debate, a distinction is made between the 
resumption of the wharves as a state interest and the resumption of the 
'Rocks' as an ad hoc concession by the state to the city. When Reid replied 
that he was only referring to the area known as the 'Rocks', Haynes agreed 
25 A bill to abolish multiple voting had been introduced in the Legislative Assembly in 
June and it reached its second reading on the 26 June. What provoked its 
introduction was the supposed negligence of the City Council and its responsibility 
for the plague itself. NSWPD, 26 June 1900, p.408-9. 
26 NSWPD, 20 June 1900, p.210. 
27 NSWPD , 28 June 1900, p.552. 
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that it should indeed be entrusted with the local authority, leaving any 
operations connected with the wharves to the state. This was a crucial 
distinction since it underlined the overriding authority .of the state in the 
urban structure. The problem facing the state, in the form of the 
parliamentarians and the government, was to delineate those features of the 
urban structure which were of specific interest to the state. 
The attack on the City Council was misplaced. The trend of legislation 
had left that body highly vulnerable and relatively powerless. Successive 
governments had removed powers from the City Council from the 1870's. 
In 1873, it lost the power to license public vehicles, the powers of water 
supply and drainage in 1888, and the powers of fire prevention in 1884.28 
What is most significant is that the decision of each government to remove 
powers from the City Council was not based on their negligence in 
exercising these powers, but rather in the successful use of them. The 
powers of water supply were taken away only after the Sydney City water 
supply system began to be successfully installed in the suburbs. The City 
Council pioneered the licensing of public vehicles and it was only after the 
necessity for a similar system elsewhere in Sydney became obvious that the 
government created an ad hoc board to control licensing. These bodies had 
been created to pursue their own concerns and it could only be expected that 
in a time of crisis their response would be self-interested. At the height of 
the plague in 1900-01, the authorities responsible for sanitation, the City 
Council, the Health Board and the Water and Sewerage Board looked on 
impotently, 'each one blaming the other two for its inaction'.29 The 
negligence of the City Council was in fact a reflection of the confusion 
caused by a rearrangement of powers within Sydney by the state in the late 
nineteenth century. The establishment of the Trust was at least a decisive 
move on the part of the state to assign responsibility, and the necessary 
powers, to some form of authority capable of controlling the port. The City 
Council never had these powers. 
It took the plague to bring about the required resolution to form the 
Trust. Lyne had previously attempted to establish a Harbour Trust in 1892 
28 Larcombe, The Stabilization of Local Government in New South Wales 1858-1906, 
Vol 2, 1976, p.69. 
29 Daily Telegraph, 12 Dec 1901, Sydney City Council Library Newscuttings. 
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when he was Secretary for Public Works in the protectionist Dibbs 
ministry. The bill failed largely on account of the unease over coupling 
Sydney and Newcastle under the same legislation.30 There was no such 
opposition on this occasion. As discussed, Reid assured Lyne that he would 
not contest the main principles of the bill. Reid's major quibble was the 
decision to place both the functions of construction and of harbour 
maintenance under the same authority. Reid had been led to believe that not 
only was there to have been a Harbour Trust, but also a board responsible 
for the construction of the 'great works' as a consequence of the 
resumptions. The government replied that the Trust was to deal only with 
the area surrounding the harbour, where the bulk of the resumptions had 
taken place. For those resumptions not directly connected with the harbour, 
a general 'improvement board' would assume responsibility.31 
The Sydney Harbour Trust Act (64 Vic. No. 30) envisaged a 
commission of seven, to be appointed by the Governor, who were to remain 
in office for seven years. Four of the Commissioners would represent the 
government, leaving three to vouch for shipping interests. In this, the 
Harbour Trust differed from many other harbour authorities, such as those 
in England, where the shipping interests predominated. The reason for this 
difference was the degree of state involvement in the Sydney Harbour 
Trust. The millions of pounds expected to be spent by the Trust was 
provided largely by the state. In Britain, most of the harbour boards were 
local bodies, responsible for the raising and expenditure of their own funds. 
A somewhat similar situation operated in Melbourne where the 17 
Commissioners of the Harbour Trust relied upon their powers to borrow 
money and upon money contributed by trade interests in the port. The 
Sydney Harbour Trust was not given the power to borrow money and its 
resources were derived from state revenue. The closest analogy to the 
Sydney Harbour Trust was the N.S.W. Railway Commissioners. Like the 
Harbour Trust, they were entrusted with an enormous amount of state 
revenue to spend, subject to the authority of the government. 
Over the next few months, the constitution of the Harbour Trust was 
moulded by parliamentary debate. The number of Commissioners was 
30 NSWPD, 15 Aug 1900, p.1908. 
31 Ibid. 
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reduced from seven to three, following the precedent of the Metropolitan 
Water and Sewerage Board. This body had recently had its Commission of 
seven part-time officers reduced to three, including a full-time president.32 
It had been found that a full-time officer was necessary for the position of 
president while it was not necessary to have six other part-time officers for 
the routine duties required of them. However, the original decision to have 
the commissioners of the Trust appointed by the Governor, rather than by 
the government, or the Public Service Board, was upheld. Also upheld was 
the virtually autonomous nature of the internal staffing of the Harbour 
Trust with control of promotion left to the Commissioners themselves. 
The bill was finally passed in October, and towards the end of 
February 1901 the three commissioners were appointed. They were 
Thomas Francis Waller, Lachlan Beaton and Robert Hickson. As manager 
of the Howard Smith shipping line in Sydney and Melbourne, Beaton clearly 
represented shipping interests.33 Waller, an agent for a stock and station 
company, was a more prominent public figure. Based in Sydney, Waller 
had previously sat on two royal commissions; in 1897 for an enquiry into 
the Department of Public Works, and 1889 for an enquiry into casual 
labour.34 Robert Rowan Purdon Hickson, President of the Harbour Trust 
was undoubtedly the major force behind the new authority. An obvious 
choice for the position, Hickson had been for much of the previous year the 
chairman of an advisory board on the resumptions, having been the 
administrative head of the Department of Public Works since 1896. 
Hickson was particularly suited to his new position since much of his 
early training and experience in engineering was in harbour maintenance. 
Trained in Ireland, Hickson was appointed at a relatively young age to the 
post of resident engineer and Harbour Master at Carlingford in the north. 
From there, he moved to England where he was made Harbour Engineer at 
Barrow-in-Furness. When Hickson arrived in Australia in 1876, he was 
amply qualified to work on harbours and their construction, firstly in South 
32 W.V Aird, The Water Supply, Sewerage and Drainage of Sydney, Sydney, 1961, 
p.218. The President was made a permanent position in 1889 as a result of a Royal 
Commission in 1897 to enquire into the operation of the board. 
33 H.J. Gibbney and Ann G. Smith, A Biographical Register 1788-1939, Vol.1, A-K, 
p.44. 
34 Ibid, Vol. 2, L-Z., p.325. 
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Australia and then in Newcastle. He entered the public service as Engineer-
in-Chief for Public Works in New South Wales in 1895, responsible for all 
the major works in the state with the exception of the railways and 
tramways. The following year saw him elevated to the post of Under-
secretary for Public Works after J. Barling, the previous Under-Secretary, 
was moved to the new Public Service Board.35 
Hickson was probably a considerable influence behind the appointment 
of Henry Deane Walsh as Engineer-in-Chief of the Trust fairly soon after 
its formation. Like Hickson, Walsh had been trained in Ireland where he 
worked for the Great Southern and Western Railway Company before 
emigrating to New South Wales in 1877. The following year, he entered the 
Public Works Department where he worked under Hickson after 1895.36 
Together, Waller, Hickson and Walsh made up a triumvirate of Irishmen 
drawn from similar middle-class protestant backgrounds. Indeed, Waller 
and Hickson attended the same school in Dublin, while both Waller and 
Walsh graduated from Trinity College Dublin.37 It is difficult to be 
conclusive about the implications of this grouping of men from similar 
backgrounds, but one can surmise that their shared origins probably gave 
them a mutual understanding of each other's personal orientations and 
public aspirations. 
The Sydney Harbour Trust lost little time in setting about a reform and 
renovation of the port of Sydney. The area it controlled was enormous, 
covering a foreshore some 200 miles in length.38 The Trust was expected 
not merely to reconstruct much of the port, but to operate it for public and 
commercial use. An idea of the task confronting it can be seen in the case of 
Sydney Cove. It was suggested that all overseas vessels ought to be removed 
from the Cove as the congestion was potentially dangerous. Mail steamers 
could not, however, be removed as there was not enough room for them 
35 Sydney Harbour Trust Officers Journal, Sydney, Aug 1925. 
36 lbi.d. 
37 Robert Rowan Purdon Hickson, Australian Dictionary of Biography, Vol.4, 1851-
1890, D-J, MUP, p.389; Thomas Francis Waller, Gibbney and Smith, Biographical 
Register, Vol L It is quite possible that Hickson and Waller knew of each other since 
their school-going days as the age difference was slight. Waller was born in 1844, 
whereas Hickson was born in 1842. 
38 NSWLA, The Sydney Harbour Trust Commissioners' First Report, Sydney, 1902, 
p.26. Nearly all of this belonged to the Crown. 
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elsewhere. Instead, the Commissioners decided to tighten up the regulations 
controlling traffic in the Cove. The speed limit was reduced, the types of 
vessels which could operate in the Cove and the hours in which the steamers 
and ferries could use the Cove were regulated. Rental for the berths was 
collected assiduously. 
The advantage to the shipping companies was that new sheds were 
built, such as those for the Orient-Pacific Company on the eastern side of 
the quay. Here, shed accommodation was extended 50 feet to the south, the 
wharf was redecked and the floor resheathed. A new wharf on the western 
side of the Cove was constructed for the Nord-Deutscher Lloyd line. It 
eventually measured 1,000 feet in length, and 40 feet in width. Two large 
sheds, 300 feet in length, were constructed on top. The extension left little 
room for the steamers of the German-Australian Company located beside it. 
Instead, the steamers were brought to Woolloomooloo Bay to be berthed. 
The liners removed from the Cove included the White Star steamers. They 
were too large to be allowed to continue to berth at the southern wharf at the 
western comer of the Cove. Instead, it was arranged with the owners, 
Dalgety and Company, to build a new wharf at Miller's Point, 1,100 feet 
long, 40 feet wide, with four sheds, each of them 220 feet in length. Part of 
the deal was a huge wool store, 287 feet long, 132 feet wide and seven 
storeys high, facing the wharf. This was among the first major works 
undertaken by the Harbour Trust as it was hoped to remove the steamers 
from the Cove by September 1902.39 This was a rather optimistic plan as 
the first steamer to be berthed at the new wharf, the s.s. Militades, was not 
able to do so until December 1903. 40 By the end of June 1902, 700 feet of 
the wharf had been erected, and 1,200 feet by September 1903. By 1904, 
the sheds had been completed as were offices and waiting rooms for the 
passengers. 
At Darling Harbour, the Commissioners took over many works of 
reconstruction already begun or planned by the Department of Public 
Works. A new jetty for Huddart Parker and Company had already been 
completed, but the Commissioners had this extended by another 50 feet.41 
39 Ibid, p.14. 
40 Sydney Harbour Trust Commissioners' Fourth Report, 1904, p.21. 
41 Ibid, First Report, p.17 
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Extensive renovations were made to the sheds of the Howard Smith 
Company and new sheds and wharves had already been constructed by the 
Darling Harbour Resumptions Advisory Board before the advent of the 
Sydney Harbour Trust. In spite of the work of the earlier board, the 
Commissioners sanctioned repairs to a total of 54 wharves in their first year 
of office. 
By far the largest project undertaken by the Advisory Board was the 
reconstruction of Darling Island. This work was · started in 1897 by the 
Public Works Department and was then continued by the Advisory Board. 
It involved the construction of concrete wharves, the eastern one 1,300 feet 
in length, and the western, completed by the Harbour Trust, some 903 feet. 
The total cost of the work was in the range of 450,000 pounds and was 
completed by the Harbour Trust early in 1902. For four months of the 
year, the eastern side of the island was wholly taken up with handling wheat. 
This product was not liable to normal harbour dues and there was little 
financial return on these works . It was arranged with the Railway 
Commissioners, therefore, to use the sheds and facilities for other produce 
during the year.42 This was still not enough. A boom in the wheat trade in 
the years that followed compelled the Commissioners to sanction the 
construction of a new wharf at Pyrmont Bay in 1906. This new grain jetty 
eventually measured 1,000 feet in length and included a grain shed and three 
lines of rails given by the Railway Commissioners.43 
An additional responsibility of the Harbour Trust was the construction 
of sea walls to prevent the accumulation of rats. As mentioned, most of the 
sea walls in Sydney Harbour consisted of timber piles driven into the sea 
bed. To replace all these with reinforced concrete as in many other parts of 
the world would involve an enormous cost. Walsh came up with the 
ingenious solution of covering the sheet piling with a flat surface 
impenetrable by the rats, and reaching below the low-water mark. For this 
purpose, 'Monier Plates', hung in close contact along the face of the sheet 
piling, were ideal. The length of the sheets, ranging from 9 feet to 12 feet 
6 inches, reached down far enough into the water to prevent rats from 
making their way under the wharves. 
42 Ibid, First Report, p.18. 
43 Ibid, Sixth Report, p.6. 
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The work of the Trust along the foreshores in its first few years of 
existence was indeed impressive. In June 1906 the Commissioners reported 
that they had erected 63 buildings, altered 20 and demolished 139. It had 
erected 21 wharves, altered 11 and had 12 demolished. Over seven 
thousand feet of new berthing space was provided, 4,000 feet of rat-proof 
wall laid down and 3000 feet of new streets opened.44 
A unique feature of the wharf construction was the continued use of 
timber. Reinforced concrete was now used commonly in Europe in 
particular, and America was following this lead. It had also been used for 
wharf construction in New Zealand and in Brisbane and Adelaide, all of pile 
and deck design. Both Melbourne and Sydney were reluctant, however, to 
use the material for wharves. As far as they were concerned, timber was 
still the most suitable material, particularly for piles. Walsh was especially 
impressed with the durability of the unsheathed turpentine in the old 
wharves. When Smith's wharf, at Miller's Point was being dismantled, he 
found that 80 per cent of the piles were still in good shape after 30 years of 
service. For as long as timber was available at reasonable cost, he saw no 
reason to change to concrete. He warned in 1910, however, that unless 
'drastic action' was taken in connection with reafforestation and 
exportation, timber might run out of supply. The volume of timber used in 
the Sydney Harbour wharves is staggering. In 1909 alone, over 4,000 acres 
of forests had been denuded to provide ironbark and turpentine for the 
works carried out by the Trust.45 
Future plans included the widening of Sussex Street and a new low-
level road from Dawes Point to the Gas Works. The biggest task was the 
demolition of the wharves from the Gas Works up to Miller's Point and 
across to Dawes Point. These obsolete wharves would be replaced by new 
wharves with access to the new roadway. The wharves stretching from the 
Gas Works up to the new Dalgety's wharf would be approached by a 
widened Argyle Street, and would have double-decked sheds, with the 
upper decks being connected with a high level road way running from 
Argyle Street, parallel to Kent Street. The new jetties running from 
44 Ibid, p.7. 
45 Henry Deane Walsh, 'Presidential Address', Royal Society of NSW, Journal and 
Proceedings, Vol xliv, 1910, p.13. 
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Miller's Point to Dawes Point, on the other hand, would need only single-
decked sheds since they had immediate access to Circular Quay through the 
proposed new roadway. When they were completed in 1922, however, they 
each had a concrete bridge running over Hickson road onto the street above 
it. 
The Commissioners were understandably proud of their achievements. 
Hickson reported in 1908: 
Today the Port stands out as the first south of the Equator in clean 
lines; in the accommodation it affords to the magnificent fleets which 
enter the Heads; in the aids to navigation; and in the moderate charges 
made for the services rendered .... The Commissioners have practically 
remodeled the whole of the wharves .... Many streets have been 
improved and widened .... 46 
There was nothing particularly revolutionary about these plans. According 
to the Daily Telegraph, the Commissioners were 'sober minded' men. They 
did 'not pretend to have any far reaching premeditated plan of 
reconstruction',47 but sought instead to introduce changes piecemeal. If the 
scale of the works appeared monumental, it was the monumentality of 
bureaucratic and technical expertise, rather than human vanity. 
The Institute of Architects of N.S.W. found little to criticise when they 
were brought on a sea-borne tour of the port in 1913. They witnessed the 
construction of the enormous new Woolloomooloo wharf, built on piers of 
turpentine timber protected by Monier cylinders. This wharf eventually 
measured 1,150 feet in length and 208 feet in width. It was planned to have 
a roadway 53 feet wide run up the centre of the wharf, with double-decked 
stores on either side. The whole wharf would then be covered in a concrete 
floor. From there, they were taken to see the new reinforced concrete 
wharfs of Dawes Point, where the Trust had built rooms and offices for the 
large steamers. The editor of the journal of the institute thought the 
architects and engineers were to be 
46 Robert Hickson, 'First President of the Sydney Harbour Trust', Journal of the Port 
of Sydney, Vol x, p.242. 
47 Daily Telegraph, 8 Jan 1902. 
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... congratulated on the splendid scheme they had laid down to make 
Darling Harbour one of the finest in wharf accommodation for 
shipping in the world. There will be a beautiful broad road right 
round this great basin, in close proximity to Sussex-street and all the 
business streets and centres of Sydney. From Dawes' Point we 
inspected all the wharves and stores right round to Miller's wharf and 
Dalgety's wharf, at which stores are built of brick and stone, in 
excellent design.48 
How far the work of the Commissioners fitted into an overall plan for 
the city is, however, a more complicated task to discern. Certainly, 
Hickson, in his capacity as under-secretary in the Department of Public 
Works would have been aware of the need for integrated development, and 
his later experience as Commissioner for the enquiries into city 
improvement and the city railways would have complemented this 
awareness. Nonetheless, the Harbour Trust held no brief for the planning 
of the city except in so far as it directly affected the work of the Trust. 
When Hickson gave evidence to the Improvement Commission as the 
President of the Trust, it was primarily to draw attention to the desire of the 
Trust to remove the Gas Works.49 It was hoped to erect three jetties there, 
each 400 feet long. More importantly, the Gas Works obstructed the 
construction of the low-level road from Dawes Point to connect up with 
Sussex Street. It was 'absolutely necessary', Hickson believed, 
... that the wharfs that I have described between Miller's Point and 
Dawes' Point, and Miller's Point and the Gas Works, should have 
communication with the city, and, if we could not get the site of the Gas 
Works, there would be no alternative but to take a tunnel round under 
Kent-street and back again into Sussex-street, and so miss the Gas 
Works. The cost of that would be about £160,000 , and we would get 
no return from it whatsoever; it would be dead money. If the Gas 
Works were resumed we would get 720 feet ofvaluablefrontage.50 
The success of the new road depended on its value as a through road 
from the city, meaning the Circular Quay area, and George street, around 
to Darling Harbour and its business and trading communities. The 
48 Salon, Dec 1913, vol. 2, no. 5, P. 212-13. 
49 NSWPP, Report of the Royal Commission for the Improvement of the City of 
Sydney and its Suburbs, Sydney, 1909, p.153 . 
50 Ibid. 
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continued presence of the Gas Works, however, meant that this idea was 
impossible to carry out. Another advantage of the scheme was that it would 
relieve Sussex street of much of the traffic that had no business there. 
Traffic heading southwards in the direction of Redfern, and which would 
normally take the tortuous route through congested Sussex Street, would be 
diverted by a newly widened Napoleon Street up onto Kent Street and 
removing from Sussex Street up to 50 per cent of its present traffic. 
This is not to say that the Harbour Trust paid no attention to the needs 
of structural developments other than their own. According to Hickson, the 
newly-constructed wharves had been made so that they would not interfere 
with a bridge to the North Shore, while the tunnel under Windmill street 
being constructed for the new road had a width of 79 feet, purposely to 
allow for two railway lines, if they were ever needed. Yet even in this case 
it must be noted that the construction of railway lines along the new road 
would necessitate the resumption of the Gas Works, a fact which the the 
Harbour Trust were happy to highlight. As Hickson told the Improvement 
Commission: 
The Commissioners are watching with great interest the proceedings 
of the City Improvement Committee, and they desire to express the 
hope not only that the construction of a railway along these water 
frontages will be one of the recommendations of the Committee, but 
that such recommendation will reach fruition in the near future .51 
The Harbour Trust may not have seen any merit in the railway itself. 
Walsh, was specifically opposed to much of the railway scheme. When 
asked if he proposed a railway along the eastern side of Darling Harbour, he 
replied that he did not think it would be of much use.52 Furthermore, if a 
line was placed from the head of the harbour up to the Gas Works, it would 
be a 'positive disadvantage'. The chief companies along that strip of the 
harbour 
... trade along the coast to bring food to the people of Sydney. Not an 
ounce of that trade would be put on a railway line if it were there 
tomorrow. The same remark applies to Jones Brothers and all the coal 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid, p.52. 
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companies. I am informed by the A.U.S.N. Company, the Melbourne 
Company, and the Union Company, that they would not ship if they 
had a railway there. Their trade is of such a nature that they do not 
want railway facilities.53 
There was a case for a railway line at the northern end of the harbour, 
Walsh conceded, but even in this case, the railway line need only be 
extended as far as the Gas Works and then around to Dawes' Point and 
eventually to Circular Quay. 
His evidence was completely at odds with the evidence of Henry Deane, 
the ex-Engineer-in-Chief of the Railway Construction branch of the 
Department of Public Works. Deane was now a private engineering 
consultant. When Deane was recalled after Walsh had left the stand, he was 
adamant that a railway should be connected with the southern end of 
Darling Harbour, that is, below the Gas Works.54 He believed this railway 
ought to be linked with the new deepwater wharves the Harbour Trust 
intended to build between Miller's Point and Dawes Point. He did not see 
any necessity for the goods railway to be connected with Circular Quay. 
Confronted with these conflicting views, the Improvement 
Commissioners opted for a compromise. Their report did not oppose the 
construction of the railway 'assuming that our recommendation to resume 
the Gas Company's works be adopted'.55 It was a vague recommendation 
which stressed that the railway could be built 'when the needs of traffic 
demand it', a proposal which seems to hint at the possibility that such a 
demand did not exist. 
It seems likely that a deciding factor in the support of the Harbour 
Trust for the Darling Harbour goods railway was the knowledge that the 
Railway Commissioners were anxious to have the line built. In his evidence 
to the Improvement Commission, the Chief Commissioner of the railways , 
Thomas Johnson, outlined the plans for a new goods line, diverted from 
Redfern, running into Glebe Island, where most of the export cargoes 
would be unloaded, then on to Darling Island to deal with coal and wheat, 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid, Henry Deane, p.55. 
55 Ibid, p.xxxv. 
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and after continuing to the head of Darling Harbour where it would finally 
terminate in the area of the Gas Works.56 The Harbour Trust was no doubt 
aware of these plans before Johnson revealed them to the Improvement 
Commission. The fact that both bodies of commissioners awaited the 
resumption of the Gas Works added to the case for resumption. The 
original assurance of Lyne that the Gas Works was not an impediment to 
any prospective railway was now irrelevant as the pressure mounted on the 
government to resume the site.57 The interim report of the Improvement 
Commission dealt entirely with the matter, and unanimously recommended 
that the site be resumed without delay, whether or not the railway went 
ahead.58 
It is difficult to say if there was a conspiracy on the part of both sets of 
Commissioners to press for the resumption of the Gas Works. The two 
bodies certainly cooperated with each other from time to time. In May 
1901, the Harbour Trust made known their support of the proposals of the 
Railway Commissioners to have the government vote £100,000 to the 
Department of Agriculture in order to increase facilities for the handling of 
agricultural produce at Darling Island.59 The major facilities under 
consideration were wheat sheds, which would normally only be used for 
four months of the year, during the wheat export season. The two sets of 
commissioners agreed to have them used for other purposes for the rest of 
the year. The development of Glebe Island appears to have been largely 
inspired by the Railway Commissioners rather than by the Harbour Trust, 
although the latter were the rightful occupiers of the area. 60 The later 
construction of new jetties, railway and tram lines in this area reflected the 
56 Ibid, p.4-6. See plan No.16. 
57 NSWPD, 5 July 1900, 728. Lyne stated that such was the contour of the land, a 
railway would need to go by tunnel through the area. 
58 Interim Report, Royal Commission on the Improvement of Sydney, xviii. 
59 Sydney Harbour Trust Commissioners' First Report, p.18. 
60 Royal Commission on the Improvement of Sydney, Henry Deane Walsh, 1393, 
p.54. A Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works in 1910 produced a 
report on the proposals of the Railway Commissioners to lay out a goods railway 
from Flemington to Glebe Island. It was proposed to continue the line by bridge 
over Johnstones Bay to Pyrmont and do away with the need to carry livestock in the 
city by the main suburban line. As it happened, the final scheme went behind 
Blackwattle and on to Darling Harbour. It was extended to Glebe Island which was 
then developed from 1912. See P.R. Proudfoot unpublished PhD thesis, UNSW, 
The Port of Sydney as it has Engendered City Growth and Urban Construction, 
(1973) Vol 1. p.61-62. 
22 
value to the railways of the coal trade, which had been previously carried 
out at the Pyrmont Bay/Darling Island complex, alongside the wheat 
cargoes. 
At the outset, some of the parliamentarians were unsure of the eventual 
outcome of the relationship between the Trust and the Railway 
Commissioners. The representative of the Gipps division, W.J. Spruson, 
took a gloomy view of the combined interests of the Harbour Trust and the 
Railway Commissioners in Pyrmont Bay.61 Both these bodies had virtually 
unlimited authority over this area and, he believed, there was no means of 
settling differences if the interests were in conflict. Lyne replied that the 
Minister was the ultimate arbitrator of the interests of the two sets of 
commissioners.62 Indeed, Lyne could have gone further and asserted the 
right of the government to override the interests of either authority if it so 
wished. As he pointed out, the Harbour Trust commissioners had 'no power 
to interfere with the Government in carrying out a railway in any direction 
they like.' He speculated, in any case, that in the event of a North Shore 
bridge 'a railway in that connection will probably run down the eastern side 
of Darling Harbour'. 63 
Lyne did not however consider his government to be responsible for 
the preparation of that contingency. The site of the Fresh Food and Ice 
Company, at the head of the harbour in the southeastern comer was not 
resumed by the government in Darling Harbour in 1900. Lyne considered 
that the resumption of this site had more to do with railway matters than 
with the question of the plague and the maintenance of the harbour. His 
view on this was understandable, but the decision meant that it was 
impossible to bring a goods line from Pyrmont Bay or Darling Island 
around to the other side of the harbour because of the acute angle at the head 
of the harbour. More than one politician raised the matter. When 
discussing the Darling Harbour Wharves Resumption Bill, James Gormly 
(Wagga Wagga) did not consider the bill 'suitable' unless provisions were 
made for the railway, including 'extensive reclamations of the shallow 
61 NSWPD, W.J. Spruson, 5 Aug 1900, p.1924. 
62 Ibid. 
63 NSWPD, W. Lyne, 15 Aug 1900, 1946. 
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water'.64 After looking at the plans showing the resumed lands, Thomas 
Waddell (Cowra) also suggested resuming more land at the head of the 
harbour as there was 'scarcely sufficient room to allow of the connection' of 
the railway systems on either side.65 When Spruson suggested an 
amendment to the bill extending the resumed area to include an area of land 
around the head of the harbour, he was given a sympathetic, although 
ultimately negative, response.66 
Lyne admitted that he had been pressed to include this area in the bill 
but had not done so for two main reasons. Firstly, heavy costs were 
involved, with the area valued at £160,000. Secondly, he considered it 'had 
more to do with an extension of the railway than with anything 
else'. 67..Spruson was supported by another representative for the area, 
Samuel Smith, who warned against the failure to resume the head of the 
harbour. Unless this resumption took place, a future government might 
have to resume land up to George Street and Hay Street if they ever wanted 
a railway extension to the eastern side of the harbour, thus making the 
clearance of the land for the railway a much more expensive procedure. To 
refuse to entertain the proposal to resume land at the head of the harbour, he 
claimed, and to spend another £300,000, was like 'straining at a gnat and 
swallowing a camel'.68 To what extent Spruson and Smith represented the 
interests of property owners and others in the area who stood to gain from 
the resumptions has not been determined, but it is an aspect of their 
lobbying that ought to be borne in mind. 
Finally, we must deal with a less fortunate and more complicated 
feature of the work of the Harbour Trust-the remodeling of the 'Rocks'. 
When the Sydney Harbour Trust Act was passed in February 1901, the area 
it controlled contained very few dwelling houses, hotels or what could be 
termed residential property. There were 32 shops, five hotels and 29 
houses. The bulk of the area known as the 'Rocks', most of which had been 
resumed, was placed under the jurisdiction of the City Improvement 
64 Ibid, J. Gormly, 28 June 1900, p.545. 
65 Ibid, T. Waddell, 5 July 1900, p.689. 
66 Ibid, 5 July 1900, p.767. 
67 Ibid, p.768. 
68 Ibid. 
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Advisory Board, consrstmg of Varney Parkes, MLA for Canterbury, 
George Barlow, President of the Institute of Architects, and George 
McCredie, a contractor responsible for the cleansing of the quarantine area. 
This area was, however, passed over to the Harbour Trust in June 1901 at 
the request of the Trust. 69 The area they took over consisted of 401 houses, 
82 shops, 23 hotels, 70 bonds and stores, as well as 45 factories, workshops 
and offices, bringing a total of 803 separate properties of this sort under the 
control of the Trust.70 It was a major responsibility for the Trust which 
now assumed the role of residential landlord as well as that of port 
administrator and construction authority. Immediately upon obtaining the 
properties, the Trust condemned 71, of which 40 were houses in Day Street, 
and 14 in Clyde Street. It considered that 35 per cent of the property was in 
'bad repair', and up to December 1901, just six months after the Trust were 
placed in charge, repairs and alterations were carried out on 364 houses, 33 
stores, and 21 hotels. It was clear that the area needed to be remodeled as 
soon as possible. 
The City Improvement Advisory Board had already drawn up a scheme by 
the end of 1901.71 Several streets were to be regraded, while George, 
Harrington and Cumberland Streets were to be widened. Furthermore, a 
railway line was to be carried along Princes Street at an elevation of 25 feet 
in anticipation of a North Shore bridge over the harbour. By far the most 
significant feature of the scheme was the proposal to build two or three huge 
tenement blocks 'on a scale more elaborate and complete than has perhaps 
been attempted in any other part of the world'.72 The principal tenement 
block to be proposed was bounded by Windmill, Fort, Argyle and Kent 
Streets. The frontage of the Windmill Street side would measure 705 feet, 
that of the Kent Street side, 249 feet, and Lower Fort Street, 225 feet. It 
was estimated that this enormous building would house 700 families, or 
possibly 4,000 people. The building was to be served by lifts and 
electricity. The tenements ranged from two to five rooms, each with a 
bathroom, and the top rate of rent was struck at 12/6 per week. 
69 The Sydney Harbour Trust Commissioners' First Report, 1902, p.28. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Daily Telegraph, 7 Jan 1902. 
72 Ibid. 
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The cost of the scheme, at half a million pounds, was prohibitive to the 
incoming Commissioners. A new committee consisting of Hickson, Walter 
Vernon, the Government Architect, and Joseph Davis, Under-Secretary to 
the Department of Public Works, shelved the plans in favour of a far more 
modest scheme estimated to cost £60,000, utilising the existing streets as far 
as possible. They decided nonetheless to go ahead with the construction of 
tenement blocks, in spite of the condemnation of the plans. A commonly 
held point of view was proclaimed by R.D. Meagher, who believed 'what 
was wanted was the essence of home life, and I think that a terrace house 
would tend to that ideal to a far greater degree than a tenement building ... 
rapid and cheaper transit was more essential to the workers'.73 According 
to the Sydney Morning Herald, the tenement system was 'irresistibly 
associated with the barracks' in the minds of the working class, while the 
Evening News charged Hickson and his colleagues with 
but a very slight acquaintance with the man they are attempting to cater 
for, if they do not know that he would prefer his own little cottage, 
with its "bit o' back yard" and its front verandah, to all the tenements 
with "all the most modern sanitary and other appliances" that ever 
were built. The cottage at least, is a home; the other never could by 
any possibility be made to resemble more than a mere human hive.74 
Almost alone in the world of labour politics, John D. Fitzgerald supported 
the plans, on the basis that there was a 'tendency in all parts of the world to 
keep the workmen close to their work'.75 
When a series of the tenement buildings were completed in early 1911 
in Lower Fort Street, the public response was generally negative. The nine 
series of blocks, each three storeys high with a flat on each level appealed to 
very few: 
The rooms are very small. In some cases too small to erect a double 
bed in, if any dressing room is required in addition. The light is bad. 
Although the general fittings are good, yet when one is told that the 
73 Sydney Morning Herald, 12 Feb 1902. 
74 Evening News , 31Jan1902. 
75 Sydney Morning Herald, 12 Feb 1902. 
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coal bins are inside the pantries underneath where the shelves for 
keeping food are fixed, an idea of the arrangements can be gleaned.76 
A deputation of the Labour Council of N.S.W. and of the Coal Lumpers 
Union was also less than impressed with the new tenements. One stevedore 
complained they drive 'men to the public house parlours. They destroy the 
family life. They strain the marriage-tie'. The new buildings of Munn 
Street were considered to be little better than 'kennels'. 
The Trust was never entirely happy with the prospect of collecting 
rents from the four to five hundred tenants it inherited, but it felt matters 
were made more difficult by the tendency of many of the tenants to strain 
their new landlords to the utmost. 
It has been evident that a number of tenants of the resumed properties, 
having the Government for a landlord, had no intention of paying 
rental if they could help doing so. 77 
The 'Rocks' became a battleground between the inhabitants of the area 
and the government. In 1911, the Premier, James McGowen, felt 
compelled to inspect some of the properties as a result of the outcry over the 
new tenements, but also as a result of consistent complaints about the 
'administration of the officers who had the management of the Government 
property, and transacted the business with the Government tenants'.78 
What exactly the administration was guilty of was never fully 
described, although the Sydney Morning Herald suggested that 'the 
evidences of mismanagement in the administration of the area' had been 
made clear to the Premier. Certainly the conditions of many of the houses 
were appalling. McGowen had only to ascend to the first floor of Dyers' 
buildings, in Harrington Street, before he cried 'enough' to the delegation 
that accompanied him. The point had been made. 'Vile odours winded the 
stairway' according to the correspondent of the Daily Telegraph. Tm 
getting a roasting', said the Premier, running in retreat from the women 
who pulled him every way to to get him to look at the state of the flats they 
76 Daily Telegraph, 15 Feb 1911. 
77 Sydney Harbour Trust Commissioners' First Report, 1902, p.28. 
78 Daily Telegraph, 14 Mar 1911. 
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were expected to live in.79 In May 1911, the management of the 'Rocks' 
was transferred to the newly fom1ed Housing Board in the hope that it 
might be better managed in future. This was not the end of the matter, 
however, for later in the year the administration of the area was subject to a 
select committee of the Legislative Assembly as a result of continued 
allegations of maladministration. 80 
Thus, the Sydney Harbour Trust proved itself to be more able as an 
administrator of the port of Sydney than as a residential landlord. The 
intricacies of managing property for statutory and commercial purposes 
was a far different matter to that of managing tenements and houses for 
people to live in. The complexity of coping with demands of home life was 
simply beyond the scope of the engineers, trained and experienced in the 
construction of harbours and bridges. What the engineers were most suited 
for was the reconstruction of the harbour in line with advances in their own 
profession. The role played by engineers in the Harbour Trust is a response 
to the impact of the adaptation of steel and iron to the shipping industry, and 
the enormous increase in the size of the wharves, decks and sheds are a 
recognition of a new era in shipping. 
To this extent, the work of the Trust is part of a general process of 
urban construction set in motion by the state in the first quarter of the 
century. As in the case of the Trust, the process was partly owing to the 
outbreak of the plague, but also to technological advances. In addition to 
steel and iron, electricity and concrete had an irretrievable effect on 
Sydney. Buildings became bigger and higher, traffic greatly increased, and 
plans were actively made for a city railway and a bridge to span the 
harbour. The concern over these changes, and these possibilities is 
exemplified by the 1909 Royal Commission on ln1provement, when men 
and women from all walks of life suggested improvements to the 
metropolis. 
79 Sydney Morning Herald, 16 Mar 1911; Daily Telegraph, 14 Mar 1911. 
80 NSWPD, Vol43, 14Nov 1911,p.1660. Thetargetofmanyoftheaccusationswas 
the manager of the area, Mr F.F. Hall, who had been in charge when it was under 
the control of the Harbour Trust. 
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The Trust did not see itself, however, as responsible for the overall 
'improvement' of the city. It had fairly clearly defined functions to do with 
Sydney Harbour, and it fulfilled those functions to the best of its ability. 
The Trust may be put into the context of the creation of various ad hoc 
bodies to provide well-defined services in the metropolis. In this way, the 
state distanced itself from the day to day running of Sydney, but at the same 
time, eroded the powers of the municipal councils, in particular, those of 
the City Council. Once formed, the Harbour Trust consistently opposed the 
transfer of powers to local councils. The Harbour Trust was a state-
supported body, similar to the Railway Commissioners, and it reconstructed 
the harbour in order to serve the state as a whole. This is particularly 
evident in hindsight, when the Trust was eventually superseded by the 
statewide Maritime Services Board in 1935. The process makes clear the 
colonial nature of the state, which first established its authority and 
infrastructure in the capital city and then moved out to the rest of New 
South Wales. The work of the Trust is, therefore, part of a colonial 
intention, confident of its future. 
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